My boycott of Israel

A lady who writes for the Guardian is going to boycott Israeli goods. 

My own increasingly stringent boycott of Israeli goods and services is entirely involuntary being the unintended bequest of the wise men who have run the global economy into the ground.

However, I sympathise with people who still have the cash to be able to make a meaningful gesture of moral superiority against a small Asian country- scarcely unique in having too much history and too little geography.
An E.C consumer boycott of Israel will mean that, ceteris paribus, resources will shift to the defence sector which will give Israel a vested interest in ratcheting up tensions in the region.
A boycott of Israeli academics- apart from being abhorrent on principle- is likely to have a similar effect.
However, it may be, that unbalanced anti-Zionist vituperation in the West- which gives legitimacy to our avowed enemies- impacts so dramatically on Western Jews that they may then use their influence to compel the Israeli government to do dance to our tune.
I have no idea whether Western Jews of the sort I envisage as being affected by the current Anti-Zionist hysteria- really have that much influence on the State of Israel. If they do then the Zionist State deserves to perish.
Like the Palesteninians, the Druze, the Lebanese Shia- like any other sect or linguistic group in the Middle East- the Israeli sabras aren't simply going to disappear because the moral dilemmas involved in their existential struggles are too complicated for our bien pensant world view and habit of after dinner moral outrage.
Still, I think it is important that- at this time of global financial crisis- Guardian readers give all their attention to this issue. Not to do so, might have consequences. And that would never do.

Why do people hate America?

In my view, post-War America offered a very radical solution to the problems of the old world. This had to do with disintermediating the National Bourgeoises of reconstruced or newly constructed Nations. The Americans had never developed a Romantic ideology. The Americans did not have a Bildungsburgertum whose road to class power was a Romantic identification- or projection of their own anxieties and frustrations- even their disappointments in love- onto a grand National canvass. The Americans would have no truck with the wounded sensibilities, muddled thinking and histrionic posturing of the National Bourgeoisies of emerging or reconstituted nations. In this they departed from the rules of Great Power Politics which had admitted Romantic Nationalism as a force to be reckoned with- albeit as an infantile disease- and which needed to be soothed and placated and ultimately harnessed to the greater goal of maintaining the balance of power.
The Americans, however, pointed out that the Balance of Power had failed utterly. Furthermore, National Bourgeoises had also utterly failed in their world historic mission as carriers of Enlightenment values. This created a curious contradiction whereby it was Stalin and his successors who championed the National Bourgeoisie and pandered to their chauvinistic shibboleths even against local Communist cadres. The American disdain of National Bourgeoises went hand in hand with the truly new, the truly revolutionary weapon in their intellectual arsenal- namely their repudiation of the law of diminishing returns- which in Classical economics- predicts increasing class conflict as the inevitable price of Growth. In other words, if the management of class conflict ceased to be the main business of Politics then the Middle Class had no special status, no priviliged dialectical relationship with the destiny of the nation.
Unlike the Soviets, with their spurious statistics, the Americans genuinely represented (at that time) a mode of production with increasing returns- not diminishing returns. But this meant class conflict was bound to vanish in line with the ‘Kuznets curve’ which yielded greater rather less income equality thru the 50’s and 60’s. In other words, the Americans had found a way of doing without the middle class. The advisors they sent out proposed truly radical changes- e.g. land reform to directly emposer the peasant to boost agriculural productivity and set off a virtuous circle of economic growth. Their answer to the problem of manufacturing industry was similarly ground-breaking. It involved the adoption of a rational, meritocratic Corporate Culture which would consign traditional concepts of class and status to the dung-heap of history. Thus, like Henry Ford, the Americans were telling their clients that History was bunk. The shibboleths and irredentist claims and so on that the National Bourgeiosie termed ’sacred causes’ were nothing of the sort. They were senile ravings- nothing more.
The National Bourgeoises of client states were particularly affected by this aspect of American policy. They, who most craved American attention, were told in no uncertain terms that their vapouring and posturing was merely a senile affliction and had no connection with the ’soul’ or the ‘destiny’ of the countries they claimed to lead.
The American denial of the concept of the Balance of Power had the corollary that guaranteeing the nuetrality of small powers was no longer a Great Power responsibility. Dulles quoted St. Paul to client states saying bluntly- ‘if you’re not with us you’re against us.’ Fair enough, we might think, if the Americans had also been ‘all things to all men’ In other words if they had taken the trouble to understand the wounded amour propre, the damaged National psyches of the middle classes in the client states. The Americans refused to play that game. They were’nt going to play nanny to senile delinquents.
Fair enough, if it had stopped there. But the Americans, from the McCarthyite era onwards went a step further.They required the National Bourgeoises of their client states to sacrifice their ‘pinko’ poets and playwrights and journalists- send them to jail or into exile. But, the National Bourgeoisie needed this type of ‘Narodnik’ populist to build bridges to the masses and thus shore up their own sense of security, of being in charge. Thus clienthood to America meant that the National Bourgeoises felt cut off from the Masses. Another feature of American policy was their belief that no man was indispensable- they could get rid of a local strong-man and replace him, for some cosmetic reason, with a nonentity without rocking the boat. The consequences for the National Bourgeoises were catastrophic- they no longer knew to whom to kow tow to. The leadership in client states also responded to this increased uncertainty by cutting themselves off from the people. The basic notion of consultative govenrment was undermined becuase in the end the American Ambassador called the shots.
America, which logically should have been the champion of the Nationa Bourgeioises, turned out to be their fiercest enemy. The increased insecurity and sense of worthlessness experienced by middle class people in client states ultimately took the form of hatred. When the master is capricious (not cruel) when his reasoning is opaque to you, when there is no chance of a dialogue, the only way to preserve your psychic integrity is to hate.
Still, I think, if client states had fully taken advantage of American know-how, of radical American thinking on social engineering, they would have been better of in the 50′’s and 60’s. However, by the beginning of the ’70’s peoples perceptions changed. The age of increasing returns was felt to be over. There was a rsource crunch at the planetary level. The perception was that some at least of the client states were basket-cases. American neede to disengage. Infinite prosperity was no longer on the table.
At the same time structual changes in the U.S economy- the change in the nature and the ethos of the American business corporation- together with an ever increasing signal extraction problem with respect to American foreign poliy- too many Agencies and intrest groups having a say in foreign policy- have compounded the problem of National Bourgeoises. The doubt has been sown in people’s minds that engagement with America means locking oneself into an operating system whose licensing fee will becomong increasingly unaffordable. The terms of trade are shifting against you. Perhaps your only way to survive is through emigration to the West! But, emigration raises the danger of assimilation- of losing your National ethos and your status as a ‘cultured’ Bildungsburgertum. What on earth are you to do? Not everybody can write books like Ziaudding Sardar or Mohsin and so on. Some people are going to chuck bombs.
The American War on Terror- which on the face of it appears justifiable- has a sort of system effect, a sociological dimension which American analysts have not picked up on. This has to do with the curiously step-motherly treatment the Americans accorded their natural allies- viz. the National Bourgeoisies of the reconstructed or newly created nations of the post-war world.
What is the solution? Well, presumably, the Americans have to go back to the old style of Great Power Politics based on minutiae of the Balance of Power and an exhausting diaolgue with Romantic Nationalists.
But, this means that International Politics is closed for Presidential grandstanding. Not here, not in this arena, can President’s carve their legacy.
Ultimately, people learn to love that which they can predict. They grow to hate that which they do not understand. When no Beltway insider can predict what America’s next move is in (let us say) Pakistan how on earth is the middle class professional in Karachi supposed to feel next time he sees his neighborhood go up in flames?
America needs to speak to the world with one voice, to be predictable in its actions, to pursue long-term relationships not ideological chimeras or ‘wag the dog’ Media circuses.
The revolving door between State and the Think Tanks and Universities has played a part in destabilizing people’s perceptions of America’s intentions.
However, to conclude, nothing can justify terrorism or mindless Anti-Americanism. On the contrary, the Americans did offer something new to the world in the 50’s and 60’s when they offered to export knowledge for free. Whether it still has something to offer- now that intellectual property commands the highest price tag- is a question I am not a competent enough economist to answer.

Is Pakistan responsible for Mumbai terror attack

Is Pakistan responsible?
Both Pakistan and India used Intelligence Agencies to fuel insurgency. Pakistan however sought to control Islamist insurgencies both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. This ultimately weakened those insurgencies. India also backed an insurgency in Bangladesh. However, the Indian aim was to get the genocidal Pak army out before Bengal turned into a second Vientnam. Still the Indian political class became paranoid about RAW and later on it was drastically cut down to size. In Pakistan, the ISI used terrorism and insurgency to give their country strategic depth and bargaining power. It is an open question as to whether this strategy has paid off. Certainly a lot of money has come to Pakistan as a result. The question is would Pakistan have done better under Civilian control? The plain facts of the matter are that India- unlike Pakistan- has no territorial ambitions. India does not present a threat to Pakistan. But if there is no external threat to Pakistan- at least from India- then there is a major threat to the Army and the ISI. What is to prevent their being cut down to size? In India the Army has no political power whatsoever. Back in the early 70’s there were rumours that Sam Maneckshaw- the Army Chief would intervene. Mrs. Gandhi called him in but there was nothing to the story. Similarly, during the Emergency, there was a lot of talk about RAW rigging the upcoming elections. It wasn’t true. Still, the Indian tradition has been to marginalise the military. In some Indian States- those afflicted with Naxalite activity- we see that, from Independence onwards, the Centre tried to bolster para-military and reserve police forces so as to counter a perceived threat from the Left. This strategy proved entirely counter-productive.
Indian political life is chaotic and today’s elite may be rendered impotent the next day. There is a huge amount of violence and criminalization in politics. However, India is not exporting its problems as Pakistan is doing. This is because, the State is essentially democratic- oriented towards seeking political solutions- the game of parliamentary musical chairs- rather than founded on an over-riding ideology.
There is no comparison between India’s involvement with its neighbours and that of Pakistan.
Genocides carried out by Pakistan against its own citizens- including air strikes in Baluchistan and mass rapes and slaughter in Bangladesh- make anything the Indians did pale into insignificance.
POK is not at all Azad. It’s government is not elected. The people are not free. The people mainly speak a language similar to Punjabi unlike the Kashmiri speaking majority in the valley. Will the nouveau riche of Muzzafarabad- grown rich on remittances from relatives working abroad- really accept the domination of the better educated but poorer Kashmiris of the valley? Nutty Jihadism paranoia is the vehicle by which they hope to foreclose democracy as an option for that region.
The tragedy is that Pakistanis are a hard working people with a great commercial ethos. They should come up economically and exert dominance that way. There is no military short cut to prosperity. This is not the age of Genghis Khan or Nadir Shah.
India, of course, is not an ideal country. Its politicians care for nothing except to grow rich and fight amongst themselves for the title ‘champion of the poor’. However, India has an active Civil Society. A people’s movement is needed to drive out the criminals and crackpots from political life. The police, in particular, must be made autonomous and answerable to the public only through the judicial- not the political- system. Success in tackling terrorism of the Mumbai type rests largely on the ordinary policeman- not the super Agencies. This, at any rate, is what U.S experts have found out. You can read STRATFOR on the subject.
Still, the question remains- is Pakistan profiting by its strategy or is it losing money? I honestly don’t know. However, my thinking is, now a World recession is upon us, Pakistan will find it more difficult to get external finance for this agenda. Of course, America under Obama may intensify the Afghan war thus giving Pakistan a respite.
We shall have to wait and see.

Zionist terror and Anti Semitic terror- why the asymmetry?

Under British occupation, some brave Jews in Palestine took to terrorism. Later on, because Israel developed in a democratic and transparent way with public officials turfed out of office, no matter how charismatic, on the basis of their performance on ‘parish pump’ issues- terrorists, though still present in small numbers in the 1970s- were simply weeded out of the mainstream. The feeling was ‘oh the poor misguided fellow- well, what can you do? Some Mothers do have them, it sometimes happens even in the best families.’ Thus it was pity- and perhaps a faint hint of ridicule- which pretty much knocked Jewish terrorism on its head.

Turning to those Arab, and other self-professedly Islamic, societies which have made a quite deliberate choice of identifying with Palestinian victimology and harnessing its rhetoric to their own chiliastic legitimating ideology- we find in case after case that it was the absence of transparent political and judicial processes, the subversion of consultative representative bodies- elected or not- which created this formula of unlimited hate reinforced by spasmodic, strategically self-defeating, unlimited terror.
The case of Pakistan- the prime mover in the nexus which spawned Al Qaida and the Taliban- is instructive. A democratically elected tyrant- Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto- subverts all institutional checks on his power by using a matryology which in some garbled manner links up Chairman Mao and Chairman Arafat, with the result that the Pakistani economy- in particular its social infrastructure- goes into the toilet.
Bhutto believed his Army Chief- Zia- who had fought the Palestinians in Jordan- was too compromised to pose a threat. He was wrong. Bhutto was hanged. His sons went to Afghanistan- then under the Soviets- and engaged in terrorism. They gained sophisticated weaponry from the P.L.O- in return for cash provided by the Emirates- and tried to bring down Zia’s plane. They failed. Ultimately, Bhutto’s sons were probably eliminated by family members.
What is remarkable is that the slogan of Palestine could be used by both Zia and his successors in the Army/I.S.I, as part of their ‘Mard-e-Momin’ ‘Islamic Superman’ ‘josh’ sessions (morale building seminars), as well as by Bhutto loyalists. It seems Palestine- or more to the point, demonising Jews- is a multivalent symbol.It means everything to everybody because at bottom it means nothing. The former wife of a Bhutto satrap- Tehmina Durrani- has recorded a bizarre incident in her auto-biography. Her younger sister- who appears to have had a chequered past including a questionable relationship with her brother-in-law- is courted by a wealthy young Jewish man from New York. He agrees to convert to Islam to marry her. However, the real sticking point is her family’s demand for a large sum of money. After all, the fellow’s a Jew and not to bleed him would be irreligious. The New Yorkers smell a rat and back off.
I quote this incident to show that posturing hate speech plus terror is just adolescent immaturity which flourishes in regimes where there is no free discussion, no transparency, no accountability.
Ultimately, countries like Pakistan are reaping the whirlwind but not before they suckered us into paying them off big time. In other words, the question cui bono, the suggestion ‘follow the money’, is still the crucial element in explaining the whole sorry mess.
Turning to the question of shame and guilt cultures- an erroneous idea that entered scholarly discourse because of the special war-time conditions prevailing amongst Japanese p.o.ws- there is little evidence that such notions have explanatory power in the Muslim context. Certainly, kinship and quasi-kinship affiliations have a greater strength in a context of an absent or debilitated ‘civil society’- especially if there is a concerted political instrumentalisation of civic disorder- and, no doubt, expressing hate for the out-group has its value- but, surely in the Middle East more than anywhere else, there is also the notion that meaning is not in use but that meaning must be gamed. So ‘Death to Israel’ actually means ’sorry mate, I’m not gonna repay that loan you very kindly gave me,” while the riposte, “My Allah shower blessings on the Revengers tho’ Allah is the best of plotters and God destroy America y’all have a nice day now” actually means, “Oh yeah? Well in that case I’ll sick Al Qaida on your ass.” At which point the other guy mentions ‘Westoxification- the shameless way their women dress! Allah have mercy.Surely the End of Days is upon us’ which means, ‘Hey, no need to get nasty. I really don’t have any money. But my daughter’s just turned twelve. How about it?”
Which explains why you gotta kill your sister or mom or daughter- otherwise they just cease to be fungible assets. It’s a portfolio choice thing- simple economics is all. Change the incentive system- behaviour is changed. That’s the point of reason and the rule of law. We can get together and change the social contract to generate benefits for all. But there has to be transparency and accountability otherwise the bad coinage of nutty discourse will drive out the good currency of reason and utility and well, folks, that’s pretty much how these countries got to this mess in the first place.

Robert Putnam, Social capital and the flight to terror

Robert Putnam is this Harvard professor who wrote about how more ethnic diversity might lower social cohesion and retard the formation of 'social capital', the inter-connectedness of society, the provision of public goods and so on. Might a reverse process by which the aggresive assertion of identity under circumstances of increased social stratification lead to the creation of negative social capital, a surplus of public 'bads'- in short, the increasing export of hate and terror by societies which ultimately can produce nothing else?

To summarise why Putnam's original thesis might make sense (to me)- I jot down the following thoughts

    The dynamics of social capital formation as impacted by differential rates of diversity- i.e. why diversity might factor in comparative rates of associativity over time- is, I imagine, a function of

1) the likelihood of negative exogenous shocks- economic or otherwise. Presumably sauve qui peut would be the more natural reaction in less homogenous contexts with both individuals and marginal communities voting with their feet as I believe has happened recently in Emporia (?) where the local Somali community decided to leave en bloc after the closing of the big meat packing plant. More generally, gold rush towns are diverse- indeed increasing diversity drives fungibility- but quickly become ghost towns for that very reason. But, this suggests the idea that Putnam’s result may reflect the perceived increased vulnerability to exogenous shocks in a globalised market since the Thatcher/Reagan years rather than the failure of multi-culturalism and the well known fact that coloured people are all muggers and rapists. 
In other words diverse neighborhoods, or employers with high diversity, etc. tend - under conditions of radical uncertainty- to act like Schelling focal points for gold rush camps- i.e. places you move to when you don’t want to put down roots- and places you can move out again from by selling to the next lot of the newly rootless. 
2) lowered probability of, or pre-emption of the fruits of, positive endogenous or exogenous shocks- i.e. ‘we’ve struck oil under Springfield Primary!"- let’s set up committees to decide how to spend the money! Why bother? Mr. Burns will have siphoned it all away by now. In other words the association between diversity and low social capital formation may reflect what has happened to the Kuznets curve (income distribution getting worse rather than better) as a result of those Wall Street guys- Gordon Gekko etc. etc. In other words, whereas diverse ‘gold-rush’ communities would have a strong incentive to associate if they get to keep a portion of the wind-fall, the reverse is the case when it comes to standing up to the robber barons. 
3) decline of potlatch expenditure as a social solvent coz of deindustrialisation leading to higher prices for property, services and non-tradable goods thus lowering the sacrificial value of the goods consumed in the potlatch. Run away property prices might also have a hand in creating ghettos whose natural leaders have fled. Corporate and Municipal potlatch too might decline because of the watchful eye of share-holders and tax payers and so on. Presumably, diversity reduces the legitimacy of innovative potlatch since, by definition, diversity is recent rather than a settled God of the tribe. 
4) intenser preference revelation problem under conditions of diversity- “no, I won’t contribute to building a skating rink. Hello! I’m Hindu, what I look like- frigging Eskimo?"- making local provision of public goods too costly to administer.  Also, changes in diversity- its composition rather than absolute level - probably changes the whole matrix of external costs and benefits in an unanticipated way thus rendering civic association for the provision of public goods, or the internalisation of externalities, into a losing battle. If high diversity is associated with rapid demographic turnover- as I believe is the case- then associativity is going to be reactive, more a pooling of frustration, a gathering up of grievances, rather than anything rewarding in its own right. 
5) institutionalised conflict (stasis) - gang turf wars, Public sector paralysis, the ‘doughnut effect’ etc, etc. Did I mention that all coloured people are rapists and muggers? I did? Well tick that off then.

Thinking about it, I guess au fond diversity is uncertainty. It sets up multiple signal extraction problems at every cross-roads. Goddam! I’ve just argued myself into believing diversity is bad coz ceteris paribus more uncertainty means lower economic activity- right? 
Wrong. Under plausible conditions more uncertainty means nothing but economic activity, ceaseless economic activity, economic activity seeking more and more outlets and (perhaps) thus gaining the motivation to fulfill Coase’s theorem- i.e. make up for missing markets by creating new forms of non-associative associativity- & thus, fex Urbis lex Orbis, new Golgothas and new Gods.

No here's how the opposite might happen- i.e Identity politics increasing Social cohesion but producing negative Social capital and the propagation of Public 'bads"-

1) Assume Identity politics does not lead to a change in tastes such that consumption and production externalities reinforce each other to create cheaper goods for all. This would happen if Identity politics is being artificially imposed on a fragmenting Society where preference functions are going every which way. Under these circumstances, identity politics might function purely by the creation of the cheapest tradable signal of identity affirmation- viz. hate for the outgroup. You then have a free-rider problem- unlimited hate costs individuals nothing but imposes a cost on society at the margin where it encounters the other- think Gaza, think Iran.

2) Now consider the situation where the production of hate is actually subsidised by some off shore deep pockets. You then could have a society whose state apparatus is funded off shore and for a purpose wholly other than the production of public goods. Here you have an Agency Capture problem and again a flight to terror, the breakdown of the moral cohesion of the nation- think Pakistan

Pakistan's Existential Crisis

To understand Pakistan's current malaise we need to understand the fundamental existential crisis that has dogged the country's policy makers since its inception.

In essence, the creation of Pakistan meant that West Pakistan – which had a smaller industrial base, a less educated population, and a smaller class of skilled politicians – was left saddled with the entire burden of defending the North West Frontier. It also had a disproportionately large share of the British Indian Army. However, the British military model was a ruinously expensive one.

Kipling, in his poem "Frontier Arithmetic" made this point very well- when a British subaltern falls to an Aghan Jezzail rifle- a thousand pounds of college education is laid waste by a gun sold for a couple of rupees in the bazaar.

The British, of course, having the entire resources of the Sub continent, could afford to pursue a forward policy to protect the settled areas from the war like tribes. Pakistan, however, did not have the resources to do so.

Suppose the Pakistani military had launched operations against any frontier tribe that threatened the peace. The tribe then retreats into Afghan territory where it either absorbs or is absorbed by another tribe. The process continues until a super-tribe is created which then defeats the Pakistani army. Thus a forward policy has its limits. A defensive policy involves taxing the settled areas to protect them from marauders. However taxes will drive the marginal peasant into social banditry. This leads to population movements and again ultimately a super-tribe is created which over-runs the Imperial army.

In response to this sort of, unconscious, thinking, Jinnah offered the Frontier tribes virtual autonomy- beginning a long tradition of avoiding pressing problems to face imaginary threats.

It was also felt that democratic elections- as a way of creating a legitimate, popularly accepted, tax funded Army for the new country- was not a viable option. Why? Well, West Pakistan needed the East Wing's foreign exchange earnings to maintain its bloated British style Army. If elections had been held, the more sophisticated Bengali political class would have ruled the roost- greatly to the resentment of the Punjabis and Pakhtoons who combined a sense of racial superiority with the, perhaps well founded, belief that the Bengalis would do them down when it came to making speeches and forging political alliances. Another reason why Pakistan could not take the logical step of using the political process to create legitimacy for a taxation system that would give the Army the resources it needed was because after the assassination of Liaqat- the last Pakistani politician with 'National' standing- by the Afghans, no great hopes could be pinned on the creation of a new, specifically political class, ab ovo.

The Pakistan Army refused to give up its spendthrift British ways- indeed, its officers outdid their former masters- and thus could not find a economically viable strategy to simultaneously police its own Frontier as well as counter an Afghan threat. In this context, a Jihadist pledge to conquer Kashmir was essential window dressing.

During the 50's, the Army and the Civil Service, faced with a resource crunch, reached a modus vivendi whereby East Pakistan's foreign exchange was put at the disposal of the West wing while opportunism in Foreign Policy – especially the American alliance – and pragmatism in domestic Economic policy grew the Economy at a respectable rate while securing quite good military equipment at a bargain price.

The question the Indians might ask is why, given the use of tribal irregulars in the 1948 invasion of Kashmir, the Pakistan Army did not adopt a strategy of training and arming war like tribes to create a force multiplier. The answer has to do with the refusal of irregulars to toe the line, to take orders, and their determination to follow their own interests. Thus the Pak invasion scared off the Muslims of the valley because of the atrocities committed by the irregulars. This pattern was repeated in 1965 when the Valley refused to rise up to support the Pak military incursion. This was not for lack of agents in the valley or because the Pakistanis hadn't spent money lavishly. The fact is both tribal fighters as well as religiously motivated insurgents want the Pak army to destroy itself against the enemy- any enemy- while they sit on the sidelines waiting to pick up the pieces. In other words, since the Pak army is the successor to the British Army, it too is the enemy.

Thus in the 1950's and 1960's- armed by the Americans – the Pak Army, eschewed asymmetric warfare and relied on growing the economy and bleeding the Bengalis so as to win popularity and, ultimately, a victory over India wit zero monetary cost to the West Wing.

That strategy failed.

Ayub Khan's gamble, in 1965, failed to secure him the title of 'Ghazi' and a status like unto Ataturk, because of the failure of the promised Kashmiri insurgency as well as the tactical failure to train up a Bengali militia capable of putting pressure on the Siligui gap thus splitting the Indian infantry..
Meanwhile, improved education, social mobility, and standards of living fuelled the demand for representative democracy even in the West Wing- though if the demonstrators had any sense they would have seen this meant equality for, if not domination by, Bengalis.

A bizarre situation arose where Bhutto – a clever aristocrat, co-opted by the Army – became the hero of the students simply because of some anti-Indian bluster at the U.N.

Precisely because Bhutto was the Army's creature, precisely because Bhutto had no experience of how democratic politicians actually operate, Bhutto formed the determination to become an absolute ruler. His determination to turn the country topsy turvy brought him the adoration of many from marginal backgrounds and has contributed to his cultus to this day.

In his quest of absolute power, Bhutto was part of the cabal who tricked Yahya Khan – Ayub's alcoholic successor – into holding elections and then imprisoning Sheikh Mujib, the Bengali leader, when he won a majority. Bhutto wanted the Army and Bengalis to cancel each other out of the equation giving him time to consolidate his power in the West Wing. No doubt, Bhutto thought the firm friendship of China and the U.S, whom Pakistan had brought together, would prevent India intervening. In other words, Bhutto thought he would win kudos by brokering an agreement between the Army and the chastened Bengalis in his own good time.

However the Indians, aware of their strategic weakness in the East in the face of a China-Pak alliance, had taken steps under the leadership of the 'Kao-boys'- intelligence professionals untainted by political connections- and put an end to that threat once and for all. Of course, India being a democratic country, there was a revulsion of feeling against Kao and never again would India leave things in the hands of professionals.

The lesson the Pak officer corps learned from the Bangladesh war was that they had no choice but to emulate the Indians in this respect and forge links with the Afghan Islamists fleeing to Pakistan at that time. Why? Well, the loss of Bangladesh meant that the Afghan claim to Pakhtoonistan and even Baluchistan had suddenly become viable.

Bhutto's appointment of a middle class professional soldier, Zia, was meant to indicate the Army's new subordinate status. The result was the opposite. Zia was trusted by other generals precisely because he was middle class- he hadn't schemed his way to the top. Under the triumvirate that emerged, army officers felt they could rise by showing tactical brilliance rather than by sycophancy or family connections. At this time the Pak army abandoned once and for all the notion that it could endear itself to the people by delivering infrastructure based growth. It also accepted an Islamist 'Mard-e-Momin' philosophy for not just 'josh' sessions for N.C.Os and enlisted men, but also for a new class of T.E. Lawrence like officers who would go off and live with and train irregulars for the coming Afghan confrontation. This strategy paid off. Pak sponsored opposition to the Afghan regime created a situation where extreme 'Khalqi' communists lost patience and staged a coup. They planned a Pol Pot style eradication campaign of Mullahs, Landlords and so on. The Soviets became alarmed. They went in to Afghanistan to rein back the Khalqis and give the moderate Parchamis a chance. But the geriatric, brain dead, Soviet leadership still thought they were living in the era of Kissinger and realpolitik. They did not appreciate the sea-change in Western thinking that had been inaugurated by Brzezenski- who, among other things, looked to topple the Soviet Empire from within by creating a green Islamic belt around its soft Central Asian underbelly.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the salvation of the Pakistan Army. Furthermore, it turned the I.S.I program of working with terrorists into a highly profitable industry. Suddenly, the wealth accumulated by certain Army officers and their networks became a compelling reason to stay in the game irrespective of a rapidly changing strategic picture.

Pakistan's anti-Americanism dates from this time. Their chosen protégé- Hekmatyar- was a drug dealer who feared the F.B.I. Thus he was anti-American. Pakistan had every reason to cultivate this strain in Islamist thinking as it prevented the two parties to the deal from cutting them out as the middle-man.

In the long run this was a disastrous strategy because it meant that the West cut of all funds after the Soviets left- creating a situation where the flow of power was reversed and Pakistan became a terrorist sponsored narco-state rather than a free agent.

Indeed, the curious gamesmanship of the Pakistani- whereby the desire for tactical brilliance is carried to the point of strategic suicide- became heavily entrenched during the 80's. It could be argued, of course, that the creation of Pakistan, itself, was Jinnah's tactical brilliance driving him relentlessly forward to the worst possible outcome for Indian Muslims. However, if Pakistan had developed a political class comparable to that of India, any such short-run over-reaching could have been set right in succeeding years.

The Pakistani military never had and never will have political savvy. It destroys even those instruments it creates specifically to work with. Thus the Army brings forward Bhutto and then hangs him. It brings forward Nawaz Sharif- and then locks him up and throws him out. It brings back Benazir- on U.S prompting- but then goes ahead and kills her- at least that was her own stated view after the first assassination attempt on her- there is a pattern here that is unmistakable.

The question that now arises is will this pattern extend to the Frankenstein's monsters of terrorism the Pak army has created? We know, in response to U.S pressure, Pakistan has from time to time even put pressure on Al Qaeeda- not of course on the top man or on any Saudis- still, it seems a favorable sign. Surely, the Paks can do the same to some of the originally anti-Indian outfits which are now globalized in agenda?

The answer, I think, must be no. Already on discussion programs on Pakistani channels the view is expressed that any attempt to do so will lead to the partition of the country. It is believed that America's aim- more even than India's- is to divide the country into cantons- perhaps not states but autonomous regions.

This may be possible in Iraq- because foreign troops are present there- but, how could it work in Pakistan? You can't expect the Pakistan Army- which has a history of always putting its own appetite for money and technology at the top of the Nation's agenda- to destroy not just its own export market but also its domestic base!

But what else is there in Pakistan? The function of democratic politics in Pakistan is to defend the Army when it is vulnerable. It is set up to fail in every other respect so that, when the opportunity arises, the Army can rescue the Nation from those who had rescued it.

In these circumstances, is there any way forward? Can the P.P.P and the Sharif brothers and the various other burgeoning parties in Pakistan create a viable political life for the country? No, because Pakistan won't pay taxes for their Army. Why should they? It doesn't defend them against anything. But if the politicians can't pay off the Army, who will? The U.S.? No, they are miffed because Musharraf didn't spend all the money they gave him just on guns only. He fraudulently spent a lot of it on creating an artificial prosperity in the cities, and amongst the educated class, from which he himself springs.

In any case, the U.S simply isn't in the business of nation-building.

Can the Indians belatedly say to the Pakistanis- 'we're sorry we left you with the entire burden of defending the North West frontier. Here, have some cash.' No. Because the current mess is Pakistan's own fault. There were all sorts of solutions to Pakistan's problems that could have been implemented without straining its budget. Pakistan simply chose to avoid real problems by confronting imaginary threats.

What then is the solution?

Disengagement, withdrawal, choking off supplies of cash, the inexorable working through of economic meltdown, technological sanctions- what the world needs to do is stop pouring oil on troubled waters- it isn't water, it's fire- and just turn its back and go away for fifteen or twenty years.
Failing that, we could play 'let's pretend' for the next eighteen months- that's how long it will take for Obama to do a complete volte face on this issue- while getting on with the one measure that assures our salvation- viz. beefing up our police and security forces, depoliticizing them, and putting professionals in charge of operational follow through.

Yeah, like that's going to happen!  

Fight fire with fire- terror with terror!

India has a strategic window with respect to Pakistan the like of which has not been seen since 1977. This has to do with sponsoring insurgencies within that country as well as adopting its own Islamist proxies in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and so on. If India takes a leaf out of the I.S.I playbook by making these terrorist outfits financially self-supporting by moving aggressively into extortion, drugs and arms smuggling, there will be the added bonus of exporting its own gangster class along with its lunatic fringe to Islamic countries under the banner of establishing the Caliphate first in the heart-land before then taking the jihad to infidel countries. In order to achieve this objective, India will need to disengage from America- at the publicly visible level- a course made all the easier by the fact that, with the nuclear deal done and dusted, America has nothing to offer in the medium term. Under these circumstances, India can portray Pakistan as an American stooge and reverse the flow of militancy across its borders. However, for the strategy to work the whole operation has to be made ideologically self-sustaining by being crazier than the next guy- that too in a pretty crazy neighborhood- as well as by meta-extortion- extorting the extorters, suicide bombing the suicide bombers unless they pay protection.

The example of Algeria shows how extremism carried beyond the limits of lunacy ultimately burns itself out. Of course, there is a reason why India hasn't already done this- or rather why it drew back from it. India is a democracy not because that's the fastest way to develop but because democracy is essential to its Social and Moral hygiene. I.S.I type criminality and ideological imbecility is a poison as far as democracy is concerned. So, bad luck India. There are no short cuts to National Security for you. You just have to keep plugging away at education, good governance, rule of law etc. etc. Well, Israel managed it and they are all the better for it. Prior to 1967 they didn't get much help from Uncle Sam- in fact France was Israel's biggest donor! Of course, Indians love a nice Uncleji. But, best lesson an Uncle can teach- is do your duty without fear or favour. In that case you won't regret not being given presents.